Plans, Distrust and Mobilization: world war one

Plans, Distrust and Mobilization: world war one

Closely related is the thesis adopted by many political scientists that the war plans of each power automatically escalated the conflict until it was out of control. Fritz Fischer and his followers have emphasized the inherently aggressive nature of Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which outlined how Germany would defend itself in the event of a two front war. If Germany was at war with both France and Russia, it must quickly eliminate one or the other from combat in order to stand a chance at winning the war. Time was of the essence. Due to French fortifications along the border with Germany, the plan called for a violation of Belgium's, and possibly the Netherlands' neutrality. In a greater context, France's own Plan XVII, called for an offensive thrust into the industrial Ruhr Valley that would cripple the German ability to wage war.

Russia's revised Plan XIX implied the mobilization of armies against both Austria-Hungary and Germany. All three created an atmosphere where generals and planning staffs of all the belligerent nations were anxious to capitalize on early offensive maneuvers to seize decisive victories. These military general staffs had elaborate mobilization plans with precise timetables, none more so than Germany, for whom it was decisive to consolidate victory against France before facing the slower-mobilizing Russia. Once the mobilization orders were issued it was understood by both generals and statesman alike that there was little or no possibility of turning back. Furthermore, the problem of communications in 1914 should not be underestimated; all nations still used telegraphy and ambassadors as the main form of communication, resulting in delays from hours to even days.