Guilt of Austria-Hungary and Germany

Guilt of Austria-Hungary and Germany

Early explanations, prominent in the 1920s, stressed the official version of responsibility as described in the Treaty of Versailles and Treaty of Trianon. This alleviated the victors from the consequential guilt of what turned out to be a costly and fruitless bloodbath and was not a baseless accusation; it was Austria, backed by Berlin, that attacked Serbia on July 29 and it was Germany that invaded Belgium on August 3, in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan. Though drastically simplified, such an overview clearly portrays Germany and Austria-Hungary as the aggressors, and therefore, those bearing responsibility. Not surprisingly, this resulted in the humiliation of Germany, which included the demand that Germany pay all the war costs (including pensions) of the Allies. This directly affected the global economy and indirectly contributed to the Great Depression.

The War Guilt clause, or Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, was a major issue in internal German politics in the 1920s and 1930s and worked to the favor of the Nazis, who rode the coattails of German nationalism all the way to the Reichstag. The two became largely indistinguishable. Many prominent British figures, especially economist John Maynard Keynes, rejected the Guilt clause that the French avidly supported. Since 1960, the idea that Germany was primarily responsible was revived by academics such as Fritz Fischer, Imanuel Geiss, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Wolfgang Mommsen, and V.R. Berghahn. Fischer, for example, emphasized that Germany wanted to control most of Europe or at the very least, unite it through Germany. However, as Fischer points out, diplomatic efforts to do so often centered around Anglo-Germanic cooperation. Likewise, aside from small Germanic territorial enclaves in Belgium, it is unclear exactly what the Germans had to gain in a war, whereas the French and British had territorial and economic-related ambitions, respectively.